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ABSTRACT
With the recent rise in popularity of wearable personal health
monitoring devices, a number of concerns regarding user pri-
vacy are raised, specifically with regard to how the providers
of these devices make use of the data obtained from these
devices, and the protections that user data enjoys. With
waterproof monitors intended to be worn 24 hours per day,
and companion smartphone applications able to offer analy-
sis and sharing of activity data, we investigate and compare
the privacy policies of four services, and the extent to which
these services protect user privacy, as we find these services
do not fall within the scope of existing legislation regarding
the privacy of health data. We then present a set of criteria
which would preserve user privacy, and avoid the concerns
identified within the policies of the services investigated.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—
Privacy
General Terms
Security, Legal Aspects
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Health monitoring, privacy, security, wearables
1. INTRODUCTION
As smartphone ownership levels rise, a growing market in
user-operated wearable health-monitoring technology has
emerged. While wearable health sensors have been used by
doctors and medical professionals for many years, the latest
wearable health sensors are marketed to consumers, promis-
ing lifestyle and health analysis. The majority of these ser-
vices upload raw sensor data from the health sensor to the
service provider servers, using a smartphone for transmission
of data, and to display measurements and analysis. With
one centralised location for all service users’ health data,
measures taken to preserve user privacy and security are es-
pecially important, given the health-oriented nature of the
data. The significance of user privacy and data security for
users of health applications was highlighted in the survey
conducted in [17].
In common with almost every website, these services feature
terms and conditions, as well as dedicated privacy policies.
These policies, which typically inform users of their rights,
and the extent to which the company may access and share
their data, were found in some cases to result in the company
claiming rights to the user’s own health data, and in one case
to even claim ownership of the user’s raw health data.
By investigating the types of data collected by each of these
services, as well as their privacy policies for handling such
data, it is possible to identify a number of privacy risks
for users. which users of these kinds of emerging services
may be unwittingly exposing themselves to, and the possible
consequences of these.
2. PRODUCT OVERVIEW
For the purpose of this investigation, four different health
monitoring services were investigated. The services selected
are all marketed directly to the end-user, and all were readily
available for purchase. Each service provider offers a version
of their service free for buyers of their hardware monitors.
The services investigated in this article were Fitbit, Jaw-
bone, Nike+ and BASIS.
All of these services required registration for an online ac-
count in order to use the wearable device - all information
recorded by the device was then uploaded to the provider’s
online service. After logging into this account, analysis of
the data is offered to the user via a website or smartphone
application.
Each of these services presented at least two policies cover-
ing user privacy, and in the following sections, these policies
were investigated for each service, with potential user pri-
vacy concerns are discussed.
2.1 Fitbit
The Fitbit website terms and conditions state that a user
agrees to allow Fitbit to “use and commercially exploit any
text, photographs or other data and information you sub-
mit to the Fitbit Services”, and that users “waive any rights
of publicity and privacy” to any data they submit to the
service. [7] Given that user health data is submitted to the
service through a mobile application over the internet, this
would count as “other data”, and therefore result in the user
having no right to privacy over any of their own health data
recorded by a Fitbit device.
In the event of a Fitbit user terminating their account, Fit-
bit’s privacy policy states that all personally identifiable in-
formation will be removed, but that Fitbit may continue
to use “de-identified and anonymized historical data” from
their use of Fitbit products. [8] Section 5 discusses the risks
to user privacy posed by advances in de-anonymisation tech-
niques.
In order to register for a Fitbit account, it is necessary for a
user to supply accurate and complete personal information,
and Fitbit state they may suspend accounts of users who ap-
pear to have inaccurate or incomplete registration data sup-
plied. [7] This would appear to prevent a user from making
use of a pseudonym or other privacy-preserving false iden-
tity. Such an approach was recommended by Andy Smith,
internet security chief at the UK Cabinet Office, who stated
that “When you put information on the internet do not use
your real name, your real data of birth”, “because it can be
used against you” (by criminals). [21]
Fitbit also state in their privacy policy that they record GPS
location data unless users opt out. [8]
2.2 Jawbone
The Jawbone privacy policy states firstly that all Jawbone
users are listed in a publicly searchable directory, containing
their name and profile photograph. The policy does not refer
to any ability for users to opt out of being displayed in this
directory. Additionally. Jawbone state that they upload the
contacts list, and calendar data, from smartphones running
their app. [11] While user contacts are gathered for the pur-
pose of finding friends also using the service, this offers no
explanation as to why a user’s calendar is uploaded.
Jawbone also state that they “may get information about
you from other sources” and “add this information to the
information we have already collected from you in order to
improve the products and services”. [11] There are no limita-
tions given as to the sources of this information, or the kind
of information which may be included, or even the purpose
for which this information would be used.
In addition, Jawbone also collect a user’s full name, photo,
gender, height, weight and date of birth, as well as the GPS
location of users, via their mobile phone. [11]
The Jawbone privacy policy states that “You can delete any
activity or sleep tracked in the UP band via the Help screen
in the UP app. You can erase band data by...” [11]. There
is no indication of whether this data is also erased on the
servers, or if it only applies to the local data stored on the
monitoring device.
2.3 Nike+
The Nike+ Fuelband privacy policy states that it logs and
stores the GPS location of users on its servers, and that it
collects information from “public sources” and “third par-
ties”. Again, there was no information as to the kinds of
sources used, nor the intended purpose of storing such in-
formation. Users of the Nike+ service are given the ability
to delete their data at any time. [14]
2.4 BASIS
The privacy policy for the BASIS watch service states that
“all biometric data shall remain the sole and exclusive prop-
erty of BASIS Science, Inc.” BASIS define biometric data
as being time-stamped heart rate, skin temperature, ambi-
ent temperature, galvanic skin response, and acceleromter
measurement. BASIS also reserve the right to make com-
mercial use of this data, such as selling it in aggregate form,
for marketing and sales use, and that BASIS may retain this
data as they deem necessary or appropriate. As such, it ap-
pears that users have no right to have their historical data
removed from the service at a point in future. [2]
The BASIS terms and conditions also require that users reg-
ister and provide “accurate and complete” registration infor-
mation, and keep it updated. This means that were users
to follow Andy Smith’s advice about using false identifiers
they would contravene the terms and conditions.
The terms and conditions state that “we keep all your in-
formation confidential and encrypted” [3], which is in direct
contradiction to their privacy policy, which states that “we
do not encrypt data in our database”. [2]
BASIS also state that “We may access the Biometric Data
of a user to provide customer support for such user, subject
to our internal BASIS Security Policy”. Unfortunately, no
details are given of this security policy, and therefore it is not
possible to ascertain what level of privacy can be expected
of data uploaded to the service. [2]
3. GENERAL CONCERNS
From our analysis of the privacy policies and other terms
and conditions of these services, a number of more general
privacy concerns were identified. These are not unique to
wearable health montoring devices, and a number of these
are discussed in [22]. In [9], the importance of preserving
user privacy in e-health systems is discussed in greater detail.
In particular, within the context of e-health services, Hong
et al. state that “people who use the internet for health-
related reasons have the right to expect that personal data
they provide will be kept confidential”. A natural question
as a result of such research is as to whether or not the data
captured from a wearable health-monitoring device consti-
tutes “personal data” due to its inherently private nature,
even though it may in itself not necessarily contain identi-
fying information.
3.1 Data Ownership
As discussed in [6], medical-related data poses a number of
questions, particularly with regards to ownership. In the
case of BASIS, their privacy policy asserted ownership of
data gathered from users, as their “sole and exclusive prop-
erty”. None of the other four services reviewed made a claim
to user data in this manner, although Fitbit reserved the
right to “use and commercially exploit” all data submitted
by users to their service, with no right to privacy. [8]
3.2 Classification of Data
Within the United States, HIPAA (Health Information Porta-
bility and Accountability Act) legislation [1] offers privacy
protection for health data. As discussed in [18], two main
criteria are used when determining whether or not data is
protected by this legislation. The first is whether or not
the company processing the data is a “covered entity” (these
include “healthcare providers, health plans, and healthcare
clearinghouses”). The second is as to whether or not the
data in question is individually identifiable health informa-
tion, since non-identifiable (or anonymised) data is not pro-
tected by HIPAA legislation. As stated in [18], data is only
classified as de-identified when there is no information that
can reasonably be used to identify the individual in question.
Simply removing the name is not sufficient, if the individual
could be identified through other means. This is discussed
in section 5.
The only service to make reference to HIPAA legislation
was BASIS, which stated in its privacy policy that it “is not
a “covered entity” or “business associate” under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act...”, and that
therefore the legislation does not cover data sent to their
service. [2]
As discussed in [19], from the perspective of wearable health
monitors in a clinical situation, in the event of personal or
health data being compromised, it is unclear as to whether
or not the doctor, or the wearable device service provider,
would be liable. While the services investigated here are for
use by individuals, rather than medical professionals, and as
such are not covered by HIPAA, [4] offers an analysis, high-
lighting that the data produced by a user-operated wearable
health monitoring device would not be HIPAA-protected. If
however, that data was gathered by a healthcare provider, or
indeed even transferred to a healthcare provider, it would it-
self then become HIPAA-protected information, as it would
be “considered a part of the patient’s health records”.
3.3 Jurasdiction of Data Storage
All four services studied stated that user data would be
stored outwith the European Union (which has specific and
often stronger protections for user private data) [20]. Nike+
did state that they would not transfer user data outwith
the Nike group, unless necessary for a service provider (like
shipping or payment processing). [14]
Also of relevance is the Safe Harbor agreement, between the
United States and European Union, which is a voluntary
process through which US-based companies with a presence
in Europe can self-certify that they meet the fundamental
privacy requirements required by the EU. These fundamen-
tal requirements state that:
“Under the directive, companies must allow consumers to
access their data, know where it originated, correct and up-
date information, withhold personal data from unauthorized
uses, and take legal recourse for unlawful processing of per-
sonal data” [13]
Both Nike+ and Fitbit state that they comply with the Safe
Harbor agreement. Jawbone and BASIS made no statement
regarding the compliance of their services with Safe Harbor.
4. ABILITY TO DELETE DATA
Of the services reviewed, only Nike+ had a policy which
stated users may remove all data which was stored about
them. [15] While Jawbone stated that users may delete ac-
tivity or sleep information tracked via the app, it did not
make clear whether or not such data would be removed from
their servers, or just the wearable device itself. [11] There
was also no statement made as to users’ ability to remove the
contacts or calendar data uploaded by the Jawbone service,
as discussed in section 2.2.
BASIS did not make any right to remove all user data clear,
although their policy details may have precluded such a fea-
ture, given BASIS claims ownership over user health data
(as discussed in section 2.4).
Fitbit state that personally identifiable information will be
removed from accounts which are terminated, but that they
may continue to use de-identified data already collected (as
discussed in section 2.1).
As discussed in [20], the US FTC (Federal Trade Commis-
sion) expects that commercial websites offer customers the
ability to correct or delete information.
5. RISKOFFUTUREREIDENTIFICATION
A trend we identified in the privacy policies of the services in-
vestigated was to permit “anonymised” or de-identified data
to be used for statistics or further analysis, even after a user
had ceased using a service. One potential well-documented
risk of such procedures is that of re-identification, whereby
previously anonymised data can be re-associated with the
identity of the individual it was captured from. Montjoye et
al. demonstrated in [5] the ease with which location data was
used to identify an individual, even with coarse datasets, or
with sporadic sampling intervals. Ohm [16] concluded that
reidentification of anonymised data is a significant concern,
and that “data can be either useful or perfectly anonymous,
but never both”, and that many laws offer exemptions for
anonymised data, which as discussed by Ohm, could be rei-
dentified, potentially putting the privacy of users at risk.
6. SERVICE PROVIDERPOLICYCHANGES
Of the four services investigated, none made a firm com-
mittment to proactively notify users clearly of any substan-
tial privacy policy changes. Fitbit’s privacy policy contains
a date of last modification, but states that changes to the
policy take effect “immediately upon posting”, meaning a
change to the policy would affect a user no longer making
use of the service, and that they may not even be made
aware of the change to the policy which governs the use of
their historically gathered personal data.
Jawbone’s privacy policy contained a notice that the policy
may be updated, and contains a date of last modification.
There was no statement of when these updated terms and
conditions would apply. The Nike+ privacy policy likewise
contained a date of last modification, and stated that up-
dated versions of the policy would be posted on the web-
site, and that users are “advised to regularly check whether
our privacy policy has changed”. [15] Once again, neither of
these policies would necessarily ensure users were aware of
the changes to the policy.
BASIS stated that they may modify their privacy policy at
any time, and will provide “prominent notice” by posting an
updated copy to their support page, and that users should
review this page to see any changes. The date of last modi-
fication is given on the policy.
The ease with which these privacy policies may be modified
is not unique to wearable health monitoring services - [12]
carried out an informal review of 30 websites, and found
that none committed to directly notifying users of changes
to their policy, instead leaving the responsibility on users
to regularly check the privacy policy of each service they
use. Despite this being a universal trend among internet
services, it is clear that any of the wearable health monitor-
ing services investigated here could effectively change their
privacy policy without users realistically becoming aware of
the change. Even if they were aware, only Nike+ stated
they offered users a means to remove all data held in their
account, and a future revision of the policy could theoret-
ically prevent users from removing their own data, in line
with the policies Fitbit and BASIS have in place.
7. COMPARISON TABLE
By way of comparison of the privacy features offered by each
service, table 7 was created. For each service, the privacy
policy and terms and conditions of use were used to reflect
each category. An overall privacy score was calculated as
the sum of all positive comparison results. Each category
was equally weighted due to the subjectivity of user privacy
priorities.
8. A MODEL TO PRESERVE PRIVACY
The four services investigated make significant use of internet-
connectivity, and do not permit users to make use of the
wearable health monitor oﬄine, meaning that users have no
ability to use the product without agreeing to the service
privacy policies. In line with our findings, as summarised
in table 7 previously, we propose a model for a privacy-
preserving wearable health monitoring platform.
An ideal platform for wearable health monitoring, from a
privacy perspective, would be capable of operating fully off-
line, with no requirement for user registration. Many of
the concerns identified with the four services investigated
were directly as a result of users being required to transmit
their data to cloud infrastructure operated by the service
provider. Given the increases in mobile device storage ca-
pacities, and the ever-decreasing costs of storage, a health
monitoring platform where data is locally stored and anal-
ysed on a user’s smartphone would be practical, and also
alleviate concerns of data being held and processed by third
parties.
Where cloud-based features were used, these would be op-
tional, and would inform users clearly of precisely what data
would be made available, and to whom, by using the feature,
before confirming the user wished to upload that data, to en-
sure informed consent is given for all health data transfers.
No supplementary data should be gathered from the user’s
device in this process.
To ensure user confidence in the service, and ensure users’
rights to erase their data are upheld, any internet-based por-
tions of such a service should have a clear means through
which all user-submitted data (and resulting analysis of such
data) can be permanently erased from the provider’s sys-
tems. Likewise, to minimise the risk to user’s personally
identifiable information (PII), as little PII should be re-
quested, and stored, as possible. For example, users should
not be required to enter their full name, or any other identi-
fying information, given alternative unique identifiers could
be used (such as account numbers, or user-selected pseudo-
nyms). Likewise, rather than asking users for their date of
birth, users could be asked to supply a binned age group
(for the purpose of making calculations related to health
matters), such as 40 to 45.
In order to prevent user data from being exposed to those
operating the service, the data stored by the provider should
be encrypted at a per-user level, in order to deliver a “zero-
knowledge” service, whereby the operator of the service can-
not access user data, as it is encrypted by a key derived from
a password known only to the user. This is demonstrated, in
the context of preservation of user privacy in location-based
services, in [10].
Such a product, while not inkeeping with the centralised
cloud service philosophy, would ensure that user privacy was
preserved, when dealing with sensitive data, specifically that
from their wearable health sensors, which users have an ex-
pectation to be kept private and secure. [9]
Similarly, in order to ensure that users are not adversely
affected by any future policy updates, users would be proac-
tively notified by email if the privacy policy were to be up-
dated in the future. The updated policy would take effect
from a date in the future, offering users a period of time
in which they may remove their account from the service,
along with all their data, if they do not agree to the updated
policy, and would prefer to have their data removed.
9. CONCLUSIONS
In this evaluation of the privacy policies in place for four ser-
vices in the emerging and growing field of wearable health
monitoring systems, it is clear that there are a number of
considerations to privacy which users may not be aware of.
Despite each service providing at least two policies covering
privacy or security matters, these policies appear unlikely
to be read frequently by users - in the case of one service,
their policies were directly contradictory as to whether or
not user data was encrypted on their servers. These poli-
cies were last modified in November 2012, indicating that
this contradiction has been in place for at least 18 months
without being rectified.
Two services investigated appeared to claim sufficient rights
to data submitted by users that the operators would be able
to retain recorded health data indefinitely, without the sub-
ject (the end user) being able to request its removal. In one
instance, the service provider claimed full ownership of data
recorded from the user’s wearable health sensor. Another
service operator stated that users had no right to privacy to
any data they provided the service, perhaps concerning in
the context of a wearable health monitoring device.
Two of the services investigated also made no claim to com-
Table 1: Comparison of Service Privacy Policies
Fitbit Jawbone Nike BASIS
Usable oﬄine without uploading data to server 7 7 7 7
Makes no commercial use of user data 7 3 3 7
User retains control of, and rights to their own data 7 3 3 7
Notifies users of any privacy policy changes 7 7 7 7
Offers EU-US Safe Harbor protection 3 7 3 7
Will not gather information about user from other sources 3 7 7 3
Policy allows for staff to view user data 7 7 7 3
Doesn’t prohibit incomplete or pseudo-anonymous registration data 7 3 3 7
No provision for logging of user GPS location 7 7 7 3
Permits complete data removal 7 7 3 7
States encryption is used to protect user data 3 7 3 7*
Overall Privacy Score (/11) 3 3 6 3
* As discussed in section 2.4, while BASIS state in their terms and conditions that they encrypt all user information and keep
it confidential, they also state in their privacy policy that their databases are not encrypted.
ply with the EU-US Safe Harbor data protection procedures,
meaning users may have very few of their regular EU rights
with regard to controlling the use and sharing of their own
data. While services stated they would anonymise data be-
fore selling it or otherwise passing it to other companies,
we have identified research indicating that the process of
re-identification of such data is becoming increasingly possi-
ble. As such, users could potentially face re-identification in
the future, based upon their anonymised data, if it was ever
compromised or released in anonymised form by the service
provider.
Finally, as a result of the analysis of the privacy policies of
the services investigated, a hypothetical privacy-preserving
health monitoring platform was described and specified, at-
tempting to offer a very high standard of user privacy, and
demonstrate that considerable privacy improvements would
be possible and practical, to address some of the concerns
identified in the policies of existing services.
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